Бидний тухай
Багш ажилтан
We develop a novel theoretical framework for studying the relationship between parental social networks and educational choices of children allowing us to analyze the implications of network structure, especially size and homophily, for intergenerational schooling mobility. When the market skill premium is unobservable, families rely on noisy wage information obtained from their social contacts giving rise to heterogeneous expectations across families. Under skill homophily, children in low skill families are stronger affected by imprecise information due to a smaller number of interactions with high skill families, hence, their expectations are more dispersed and they are less likely to study. This yields a positive intergenerational schooling correlation. Empirically, a larger share of high skill parental friends is positively associated with a probability of studying, in line with the model, after controlling for the education of parents, cognitive abilities and personality traits.
This paper develops a search and matching model with heterogeneous firms, on-the-job search by workers, Nash bargaining over wages and adaptive learning. We assume that workers are boundedly rational in the sense that they do not have perfect foresight about future bargaining outcomes. Instead workers rely on a recursive OLS learning mechanism and base their forecasts on a linear wage regression. We apply adaptive learning to a setting with generalized Nash bargaining and show analytically that the bargaining solution is unique. We use this solution to simulate the model and provide a numerical characterization of the Restricted Perceptions Equilibrium. We show that some job-to-job transitions decrease with workers' bargaining power due to a more efficient allocation of workers to jobs. Finally, we find that bounded rationality taking form of adaptive learning can reduce wage inequality among heterogeneous workers groups if workers' expectations are based on pooled statistical information.
Introduction to Labour Economics with Search Frictions
