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In this paper we trace the origin and use of the Mongolian term khyamral which is crisis in English. Although in a common-sense translation the Mongolian word khyamral is crisis in English, in the consideration of historical and cultural differences, they cannot mean same the thing. According to our research the term khyamral only appears in Mongolian language in the 18th century. Up until the second half of the 20th century the term indicated physical (health), psychological and social disorders that occur due to conflict of things or processes that do not match. Then only in the 20th century, probably in the second half of the 20th century, the term started adopting indications of the term crisis. A Mongolian dictionary first published in 1966, first explains the term khyamral that it also indicates “a crisis (крисис) that occasionally occurs in economic and political matters of a capitalist society” (Tsevel, 1966:771). In other words, the contemporary meaning of the term ‘crisis’ in the Mongolian term khyamral was regarded as something that is foreign that only occurs in the capitalist society. Then from 1990, when Mongolia started adopting more and more capitalistic features, the use of the term khyamral increased, mainly because, khyamral is a capitalist social phenomenon. Apparently, the term 'crisis' has become popular since the 1990s when economic reform took place following shock therapy in Mongolia. The khyamral, direct translation of crisis, has a different meaning at different times as it were everywhere, argued by many researchers (Lundström, 2022; Roitman, Angeli Aguiton, Cornilleau, & Cabane, 2020). In modern times, meaning of khyamral was reconstructed. The pre-socialist times of Mongolia was described as a period of khyamral or disharmony and crisis, especially in historical and political documents like following Georg Lukacs and Reinhart Koselleck's argument about the crisis as the precondition for the revolution or the world in constant crisis (Gilbert, 2019). Even though pastoralists often faced with climatic uncertainties and various risks everyday, they did not use the crisis or khyamral in calling such difficulties. Other scholars (Batsuuri, 2015; Campi, 2005; Marshall & Walters, 2010; Spoor, 1996; Wade, 2010; Wingard & Zahler, 2006) including ecomonic and bioligical researchers often see Mongolia's economy and ecoligical condition in deep crisis in the 1990s. This way, the word khyamral has been enriched in political and economic changes in socialist and post-socialist Mongolia. The use of the word khyamral also signifies the person's social status these days. Officials often use khyamral in a public speech to justify their wrongdoings and defend their mistakes or failures. According to the pastoralists, the khyamral represents competition and conflicts, leading to the breakup or improper functioning of state machines and the economy. Based on our literature review and fieldwork data, we argue that the concept of khyamral has been modified significantly. Khyamral has become a tool for decision-makers to avoid blame of their misconduct and increase their power by diverting public attention. Furthermore, this concept conveys that Mongolia needs solidarity, strong leadership, financial discipline imposed by the IMF, command and comply system, and political unification.
In this article, we draw upon ethnographic fieldwork conducted in Mongolia and China to develop understandings of herd–herder (mal–malchin) relations further. We focus primarily on horse-herding practices and related divisions of labour, and the three concepts of herd intuition (zön), serenity (taa) and fortune (buyan, khishig, zaya), to present additional interpretations of human–animal relations in Mongolia. Through this exploration, we develop the concept of herd agency and examine how it relates to specific horse-herding knowledge and techniques, as well as the cosmological significance of human–animal relations. All three concepts reveal the importance of cosmological agents with herd–herder relations. We conclude by emphasising the changing nature and politics of human–animal relations in these regions.
In this paper, we draw upon ethnographic fieldwork conducted in Bayanhongor and Khenti provinces in Mongolia and Quinghai in China to provide a counter-argument to Stepanoff et al (2017)’s article on animal autonomy in herder-livestock relations in North Asia. While Stepanoff et al’s paper does present insightful descriptions of some aspects of human-livestock relationships with reference to North Asia, we argue that the interpretation of livestock as being autonomous does not grasp the breath and complexity of the matter. The concept of ‘autonomy’, with its connections to the individualistic values of Euro-American society, fails to capture the complexity of herding in Mongolia and China, as well as principles of social relations in Mongolia beyond the human-livestock nexus. We focus primarily on horse herding practices and related divisions of labour, and the concept of malyn buyan to present an alternative interpretation of human-livestock relations in Mongolia. Through this exploration, we develop the concept of herd agency and examine how it relates with specific horse herding knowledge and techniques, as well as the cosmological significance of human-livestock relations. We conclude by emphasising the changing nature and politics of human-livestock relations.
There is a lack of the study of mining corporations and companies (Ballard and Banks 2003, 290; Gilberthorpe and Rajak 2016, 6; Kirsch 2014, 12; see also Benson and Kirsch 2010, 459) which is a common problem within the anthropological study of resource, mining and environment. And in the existing literature there is a conventional framework to understand mining companies and corporations as transnational and powerful institutions. For example, Stuart Kirsch (2014, 1) writes they “organize much of the world’s labor and capital, shape the material form of modern world and the prime mover of globalization with wide range of harmful effects.” As such scholars rarely discuss powerless situations of small- and middle-scale mining companies in the face of some nationalist and statist initiatives such as the powerful protest movements, national-oriented political logics and state control of natural resources. Chris Ballard and Glenn Banks (2003, 293–4) acknowledge such problems in the study of mining corporations and note that there is a monolithic image of multinational corporations as “homogenous, powerful, hierarchical, rational, profit-seeking beasts,” which “tends to mask the considerable complexity of corporations.” Anthony Bebbington et al. (2008, 2900) point out the relative power of different mining companies to do with their “sizes and resources” that they “can use to manage and dissipate conflicts.” In this paper, culturally accepted nationalist and statist initiatives and policies put small- and middle-scale gold mining companies in a powerless position to escape, hide and stop. In the celebration of nationalist and statist initiatives, small- and middle-scale gold mining company owners and directors, I present in this paper, faced different challenges, tried different manoeuvres, and many of them reported that they had to minimise or stop their mining businesses and started different businesses. Consequently, it becomes difficult for protestors, authorities and the public to know whether a company stopped its mining operations and businesses, or whether they are simply using a different name, different company, or a subcontractor to continue their businesses. In the words of Marina Welker (2014), mining companies in Mongolia, became unstable collective subjects with multiple authors, boundaries, and interests. As she points out, materials in this paper helps me to understand importance of agency in the management of a small- and middle-scale gold mining companies. To understand small- and middle-scale gold mining companies and their operations in Mongolia one has to focus on the individual agent or agents who own and manage the company or companies in collaboration. Therefore, this paper argues that a small- and middle-scale mining company operation is a multifarious and complex navigating process of some desperate individual agents acting on behalf of different companies in the unpromising environment of the resource economy.
This paper aims to unveil sources of nationalist sentiments that are often disregarded, in part because they are often given ‘pejorative labels’ such as ‘populist’ and ‘ resource nationalist’ by those who promote the market economy and mining industry. Anthropologists can extend their research beyond such labelling and find out what is at the origin of such popular mobilisations and consequent political decisions against mining. I find that the culturally accepted term nutag, which means birthplace, homeland and country of origin, is the basic source of nationalist sentiments that resist mining. The term nutag has evolved from meaning one’s naturally related birthplace to referring also to the politically independent country of Mongolia. The ideas associated with the original meaning make such nationalist sentiments different from, and much broader than, the idea of controlling natural resources indicated by the term ‘resource nationalism’.
In contemporary Mongolia—a country with 29 years’ history of international development policy—the conventional interpretation regarding the oppression of and liberation from the Soviet regime is no longer valid for understanding its politics of cultural heritage. Today, development projects and associated environmental, social and cultural assessments play a central role in safeguarding cultural heritage. Therefore, alternative interpretations are necessary to comprehend current and further processes of cultural heritage politics. This paper introduces two case studies of new cultural heritage politics involving Mongolia’s two ‘megaprojects’: Oyu Tolgoi gold and copper mining, and River Eg hydroelectric station.
In contemporary Mongolia—a country with 29 years’ history of international development policy—the conventional interpretation regarding the oppression of and liberation from the Soviet regime is no longer valid for understanding its politics of cultural heritage. Today, development projects and associated environmental, social and cultural assessments play a central role in safeguarding cultural heritage. Therefore, alternative interpretations are necessary to comprehend current and further processes of cultural heritage politics. This paper introduces two case studies of new cultural heritage politics involving Mongolia’s two ‘megaprojects’: Oyu Tolgoi gold and copper mining, and River Eg hydroelectric station.
